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INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AT THE 
MARGIN OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: 
A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 
Arthur Manuel* 
Nicole Schabus** 
In the 1999 Human Development Report, which uses data from 1996 
and 1997, Canada was ranked first among the 174 countries included 
in the report, and had the highest over all Human Development Index 
[HDI] score.  Calculating HDI scores for Registered Indians, including 
those living on and off reserve, reveals a substantially lower HDI 
score for the Registered Indian population, which would be ranked 
about forty-eighth among the countries in the report.1 
I. INTRODUCTION:  A WIDE RANGE OF INDIGENOUS RIGHTS 
Over the last three decades, Indigenous Peoples around the 
world have won important constitutional recognition of their 
inherent rights and jurisdiction.  Yet, despite these gains, the 
socio-economic status of Indigenous Peoples has not improved 
and they continue to be the poorest populations of those countries 
 
* Arthur Manuel is a member of the Secwepemc Nation, in the South-Central Interior of 
British Columbia, Canada. He served as Chief of the Neskonlith Indian Band for eight 
years and as Chairperson for the Shuswap Nation Tribal Council for seven years. He also 
headed the Interior Alliance and currently serves as volunteer Chairperson for the 
Indigenous Network on Economies and Trade (INET).  This paper is an ongoing case 
study and portions have been borrowed from an unpublished conference paper entitled 
Aboriginal Peoples v. Companies And Governments: Who are the Real Stewards of the 
Land and Forests? Growing International Understanding of Indigenous Proprietary 
Interests, submitted for the New York University’s Conference on Indigenous Peoples and 
Multilateral Trade Regimes: Navigating New Opportunities for Advocacy (May 2002). 
** Nicole Schabus holds Master Degrees in Law and International Business 
Administration from the University of Vienna. She is working on her PhD in Law with a 
grant from the Austrian Academy of Science. Nicole is practicing law and has been called 
to the bar in British Columbia.  he continues to work as a volunteer for INET.  
 1 Dan Beavon & Martin Cooke, An Application of the United Nations Human 
Development Index to Registered Indians in Canada, 1996, in ABORIGINAL CONDITIONS: 
RESEARCH AS A FOUNDATION FOR PUBLIC POLICY 207 (Jerry P. White et al. eds., 2003).  In 
the past decade, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development 
Index (HDI) has become one of the most commonly cited and used indices of well-being.  
Canada has consistently scored at or near the top of the United Nations’ ranking of 
countries based on the HDI scores.  Id. 
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in which they live.  This socio-economic status is perpetuated 
partly because, despite certain gains, many governments still 
refuse to implement constitutional provisions recognizing the 
rights of Indigenous Peoples.  In addition, the 1990s saw an 
unprecedented consolidation of international trade law with the 
creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 and the 
signing of important global and international trade agreements.  
This consolidation undermines the rights of Indigenous Peoples 
around the globe by increasing corporate access to both land and 
resources held by Indigenous Peoples and it serves to perpetuate 
an already tenuous socio-economic status. 
This article is a case study into the historic and ongoing 
efforts of Aboriginal Peoples from the Interior of British 
Columbia to secure the recognition and implementation of their 
land rights. It will be argued that the real property interest of 
Indigenous Peoples should be valued over the alleged quasi-
proprietary interests of corporations.  Unlike so many state 
governments, Indigenous Peoples have never ceded their 
sovereignty through accession to free trade agreements.  Because 
Indigenous Peoples still maintain legally recognizable property 
rights, this article argues that Indigenous Peoples are in a 
unique position to challenge corporate control over their land and 
resources under the current international law regime. 
II. BACKGROUND ON THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC MARGINALIZATION OF 
THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF CANADA 
A. Indian Reserves: The “Fourth World” Inside the “First 
World” 
The United Nations Development Program first published its 
Human Development Index in 1990.2  Since then Canada has 
always been ranked on or near the top.3  This high ranking 
indicates that Canada would be one of the best countries in the 
world in which to live.4  However, if you are an indigenous person 
born in Canada, statistics show that you would likely not be 
living at Canada’s much touted high level of development.5  
Instead, you would be living at a much lower level of 
development.6  This is especially true among registered Indians 
living on reserves in Canada whose living conditions, on average, 
 
 2 Id.  
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
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are below living conditions found in developing countries.7  
Living conditions on Canadian Indian reserves are ranked at the 
same level as a country with a rank of seventy-eight on the 
Human Development Index.8 
The situation in the United States is similar.  A recent study 
conducted by the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic 
Development found that “reservation Indians perennially have 
been the poorest identifiable group in the United States.  
American Indian/Alaska Native families on and off reservation 
are two-and-a-half times more likely than the average American 
family to live in poverty, and the situation is worse for families 
on reservations.”9  Yet the Harvard Study also found that “the 
era of self-determination has brought progress, [given that] 
Indian nations have had a long way to go in terms of their 
economic development.”10 
Addressing tribal sovereignty, the study went on to state: 
Supported by every U.S. President since the 1960s and bolstered, for a 
time, by a combination of federal court rulings and congressional 
policies, tribal self-rule – sovereignty – has proven to be the only policy 
that has shown concrete success in breaking debilitating economic 
dependence on federal spending programs and replenishing the social 
and cultural fabric that can support vibrant and healthy communities 
and families.11 
The study further notes that tribal sovereignty is 
increasingly under attack by the courts and congressional bills 
that want to abolish the tribes’ economic and legal 
independence.12  When Indigenous Peoples first started 
organizing at the international level during the 1970s, they 
vowed to work together to overcome their socio-economic 
marginalization through recognition of their inherent rights.  
They called themselves the “Fourth World Movement,” in 
reference to the fact that Indigenous Peoples are the poorest 
peoples in the world.13 
 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 208. 
 9 Joseph P. Kalt & Joseph William Singer, Myths and Realities of Tribal 
Sovereignty: The Law and Economics of Indian Self-Rule, Joint Occasional Papers on 
Native Affairs No. 2004-03, at 35 (2004), available at http://www.jopna.net/pubs/JOP 
NA06_MythsandRealities.pdf. 
 10 Id. (footnote omitted). 
 11 Id. at 1. 
 12 Id. at 7. 
 13 See GEORGE MANUEL & MICHAEL POSLUNS, THE FOURTH WORLD:  AN INDIAN 
REALITY (1974). 
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B. The Underlying Problem: Constitutional Breaches in Canada 
and the United States 
Tribal sovereignty and the right to control tribal lands was 
first recognized in a series of cases known as the Marshall 
trilogy.14  The first case, Johnson v. McIntosh, decided in 1823, 
found that Indian title to land was compatible with U.S. property 
law and could only be extinguished by the federal government.15  
One decade later, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the state of 
Georgia attempted to oust the Cherokee from their traditional 
territories within the state despite a treaty with the federal 
government of the United States.16  The Cherokee took their case 
directly to the U.S. Supreme Court, who found them to be 
“domestic dependent nations.”17  Just one year later, in Worcester 
v. Georgia, the Court found that the Cherokee had not 
surrendered their right to self-government through contact with 
the colonial powers, and still had the power to remain in and 
govern their territory.18 
President Andrew Jackson did not agree with the Worcester 
decision and is said to have stated: “John Marshall made his 
decision; let him enforce it now if he can.”19  President Jackson 
ordered the removal of the Cherokee in an act of unconstitutional 
defiance against the Supreme Court ruling.20  Known as the Trail 
of Tears, the forced march of nearly 17,000 Cherokee from 
northern Georgia to present-day Oklahoma resulted in the 
deaths of over 4,000 Cherokee.21 
The U.S. policy of removal was followed by equally cruel and 
destructive policies including the making and subsequent 
breaching of treaties with Indian populations until 1871, the 
practice of assimilation and allotment until 1928, reorganization 
until 1942; and termination until 1968.22  All of these policies 
were aimed at destroying and undermining the very fabric of 
Native American Tribes and their control over their tribal lands.  
 
 14 The Marshall trilogy consists of the following three cases, decided by Chief Justice 
John Marshall in the early 1800s: Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 
Pet.) 515 (1832). 
 15 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 592-93. 
 16 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 3. 
 17 Id. at 17. 
 18 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 560-61. 
 19 JOHN EHLE, TRAIL OF TEARS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CHEROKEE NATION 255 
(1988). 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. at 391. 
 22 For more information on these different U.S. policies see United States 
Environmental Protection Agency Tribal Training Resource Guide 29-38 (2004), available 
at http://www.epa.gov/indian/resource/modules/entire.pdf. 
MANUEL FINAL 6/21/2005 6:48 PM 
2005] Indigenous Peoples at the Margin 226 
Still, Native Americans organized themselves in opposition to 
these policies.  In 1953, tribal leaders in the northwest formed 
the Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians (Affiliated Tribes), an 
organization dedicated to tribal sovereignty and self-
determination.23  The Affiliated Tribes finally secured the 
recognition and implementation of their tribal sovereignty in the 
late 1960s, with their own authorities taking control over the 
administration of tribal affairs and the extraction of resources 
from tribal lands.24 
In their paper Myths and Realities of Tribal Sovereignty: The 
Law and Economics of Indian Self-Rule, Joseph Kalt and Joseph 
Singer detail how important strengthening tribal sovereignty is: 
[S]overeignty holds the prospect of being a win-win strategy for all 
contending parties.  Obviously, tribes are winners by their own 
standards – as they demonstrate daily by pushing unerringly for self-
rule.  But states and the federal government stand to gain as well, as 
tribes make economic and social progress, contribute to their local and 
regional economies, and take pressure off of state and federal budgets 
otherwise needed to fight problems of poverty and social disarray.25 
While the policy in the United States leaves some room for 
Native American tribes to slowly close the gap and overcome 
poverty amongst their peoples, the policy in Canada remains the 
extinguishment of Aboriginal Title.26  This policy of 
extinguishments, similar to the earlier US policy of termination, 
contributes to the inability of the Indigenous Peoples to regain 
their economic independence.27  In many ways, Canada is now 
facing in the twentieth century the same choice the United 
States faced in the 1830s.  Canada must choose to either 
recognize the judicially prescribed and constitutionally supported 
proprietary interests of Aboriginal Peoples, or it can continue its 
unconstitutional policy of extinguishing Aboriginal land rights. 
 
 23 See Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians, available at http://www.atnitribes.org 
/about.html. 
 24 See Ed Goodman, Protecting Habitat For Off-Reservation Tribal Hunting and 
Fishing Rights: Tribal Comanagement as a Reserved Right, 30 ENVTL. L. 279 (2000) 
 25 Kalt & Singer, supra note 9, at 41. 
 26 See Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Comprehensive Claims Policy and 
Status of Claims (2003), available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ps/clm/brieft_e.html. 
 27 Beavon & Cooke, supra note 1.  Canada has created an elaborate system of federal 
spending and funding programs for numerous Indian bands and tribal organizations.  
These programs not only contribute to the economic dependence of Indigenous People, but 
they help to perpetuate poverty on Indian reserves.  For example, in 1996 the GDP per 
capita for an average Canadian amounted to $ 22,480.  Id. at 208.  In contrast, the GDP 
per capita for a registered Indian living on reserve amounted to $8,720, almost one third 
the national average.  Id.  For more information on the Canadian spending and funding 
programs see Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 5 Report of the Royal Commission 
on Aboriginal Peoples § 2 (1996), available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/ 
sgmm_e.html. 
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In the 1997 decision, Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, the 
Supreme Court of Canada recognized Aboriginal Title as the 
collective proprietary interests of Aboriginal Peoples in their 
traditional territories.28  The decision applies to all territories 
where no treaties between the Crown and the Indigenous Peoples 
had been entered into, with British Columbia being the largest 
area effected..29 In most provinces east of the Rockies historic 
treaties were signed, but the debate about their implementation 
continues.  Many Indigenous Peoples argue that the “spirit and 
intent” of the treaties also ensures indigenous control over their 
traditional territories.  Aboriginal nations and organizations are 
now pressuring Canadian provincial governments to recognize 
the Aboriginal sovereignty enshrined in these treaties and to 
right past breaches of these historic documents.30 
In British Columbia on the other hand, a number of 
Aboriginal nations in the Interior refuse to enter into any type of 
agreement that would extinguish their inherent land rights 
and/or limit their sovereignty.31  Instead, these nations continue 
to fight for the recognition of their land rights and their right to 
control traditional territories.32  These rights were recognized in 
Delgamuukw in which the Court called for the Canadian 
government to enter into negotiations based on the recognition of 
Aboriginal Title: 
Moreover, the Crown is under a moral, if not a legal, duty to enter into 
and conduct those negotiations in good faith.  Ultimately, it is through 
negotiated settlements, with good faith and give and take on all sides, 
reinforced by the judgments of this Court, that we will achieve what I 
stated in Vander Peet, to be a basic purpose of s. 35(1) – “the 
reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the 
sovereignty of the Crown.”  Let us face it, we are all here to stay.33 
 
 28 [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1014 (Can.) (stating “aboriginal title is held communally.”). 
 29 Id. at 1014-15. 
 30 Id. at 37-43. 
 31 See Bernard Schulmann, Getting Treaty Talks Off Square One, POLICY OPTIONS, 
Oct. 2000, at 60, available at http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/oct00/schulman.pdf. 
 32 See e.g. Haida Nation v. British Columbia, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 (Can.). 
 33 Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1123-24 (citation omitted).  Chief Justice Lamer 
references Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution as the basis for the coexistence of 
Aboriginal sovereignty and the sovereignty of the Crown.  Id.  Section 35 is part of the 
new Canadian Constitution that came into force in 1982.  See CAN. CONST. § 35 (1982).  
Prior to that, Canada’s Constitution was enshrined in a treaty with the United Kingdom 
entitled the 1867 British North America Act.  CAN CONST. (Constitution Act, 1867), § 30 & 
31 Victoria, c. 3. 
  In the early 1980s, Prime Minister Trudeau wanted to “patriate” the Constitution, 
making it a solely Canadian Act and leaving its amendment to federal parliament and the 
provinces.  He also wanted to introduce the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, enshrining 
individual civil rights in the Constitution.  At the same time, he attempted to remove any 
reference to Indigenous Peoples and their collective rights from the Constitution.  It was 
because of this that Aboriginal nations from across Canada were opposed to the patriation 
of the Constitution.  Led by Indigenous Peoples from British Columbia who rented a train 
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The first and most important paragraph of Section 35 of the 
1982 Canadian Constitution reads “[t]he existing aboriginal and 
treaty rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada are hereby 
recognized and affirmed.”34  This provision constitutes the 
unconditional recognition of Aboriginal rights and extends 
constitutional protection to them.  Many Indigenous Peoples also 
consider Section 35 the source for Aboriginal jurisdiction, placing 
it on equal footing with federal and provincial jurisdiction.  
However, since its enactment in 1982, the Canadian government 
has refused to implement Section 35 so that it has arguably 
become nothing more than an “empty box.”35 
In conjunction with its reductionist reading of Section 35, the 
federal government has also refused to revoke its land rights 
policy entitled the Comprehensive Claims Policy.  Taking 
advantage of the Supreme Court of Canada’s divisive position on 
Aboriginal Title in the 1973 case Calder v. British Columbia,36 
the federal government devised the Comprehensive Claims Policy 
in order to accomplish the “blanket extinguishment” of 
Aboriginal Title.37  Following the recognition of Aboriginal rights 
in the Constitution of 1982, this policy of extinguishment should 
have been revoked or reformed.  It was not.  Today, Aboriginal 
Peoples from across British Columbia continue to reject this 
federal policy.  For example, in 2000, all major provincial Indian 
organizations in British Columbia signed the following 
Consensus Statement: 
 
that became known as the Constitution Express, they travelled to Ottawa to protest.  A 
year later, in 1981, they sent a delegation of indigenous leaders to England to stop the 
patriation.  As a result, Canada had to add Section 35 to the 1982 Canadian Constitution.  
See generally George Egerton, Trudeau, God, and The Canadian Constitution: Religion, 
Human Rights, and Government Authority in the Making of the 1982 Constitution, in 
RETHINKING CHURCH, STATE, AND MODERNITY: CANADA BETWEEN EUROPE AND AMERICA 
(David Lyon and Marguerite Van Die eds., 2000); James Ross Hurley, The Canadian 
Constitutional Debate: From the Death of the Meech Lake Accord of 1997 to the 1992 
Referendum, Dec. 16, 1992, available at http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/aia/default.asp? 
Language=E&Page=consfile&Sub=TheConstitutionalDebate; Union of British Columbia 
Indian Chiefs, Constitutional Express, available at http://www.ubcic.bc.ca/conxprss.htm 
(last modified Feb. 23, 2005). 
 34 CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), Schedule B, c. 11, § 35. 
 35 For more information on this ongoing debate, see ARDITH EALKEM, BOX OF 
TREASURES OR EMPTY BOX?: 20 YEARS OF SECTION 35 (2003). 
 36 Calder v. British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313 (Can.).  In Calder, three judges held 
that the inherent land rights of Aboriginal Peoples had not been extinguished, three 
judges found they had been, and the last judge dismissed the matter on a technicality.  Id. 
 37 See Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, supra note 26.  Only a very limited 
number of Aboriginal Nations from across Canada entered into negotiations with the 
federal government.  The only resulting agreements were the James Bay and Northern 
Quebec Agreement of 1975 and the Northeastern Quebec Agreement of 1978.  See Indian 
and Northern Affairs Canada, The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and 
Northeastern Quebec Agreement, available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/info/info 
14_e.html. 
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The Assembly of First Nations, the Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs, the 
Interior Alliance and the First Nations Summit, hereby join together 
publicly to affirm the Aboriginal [T]itle and rights of all First Nations 
of British Columbia and Canada.  Canada’s Comprehensive Claims 
Policy is predicated on the denial of our rights and title.  We 
categorically reject this policy and Canada’s implementation of this 
policy.  We call upon Canada to assert the honour of the Crown and to 
adopt a new policy of recognition, affirmation and implementation of 
Aboriginal [T]itle.38 
Due to the failure of the federal and provincial governments 
to take the necessary steps to implement Aboriginal rights, the 
Supreme Court of Canada in a number of decisions throughout 
the 1990s, began to give meaning to Section 35 and itself defined 
the fiduciary obligation of the federal government with 
Aboriginal Peoples.39  In 1997, in a unanimous judgment written 
by Chief Justice Lamer in the Delgamuukw case, the Supreme 
Court of Canada not only recognized Aboriginal Title, but also 
held Aboriginal Title was protected by Section 35 of the 
Canadian Constitution.40  Although Aboriginal Title is recognized 
under Canadian law, the Court went further to define it as a sui 
generis right, controlled by the indigenous laws of the respective 
nation.41 
This decision by the Supreme Court of Canada clearly 
rendered the Comprehensive Claims Policy of 1986 
unconstitutional.  Yet, despite repeated calls by indigenous 
leadership to adopt a new policy of recognition, affirmation and 
implementation of Aboriginal Title, the federal government has 
made it very clear that it has no intention of changing its policy 
or its laws.42  This categorical refusal to honor Supreme Court 
decisions defining constitutional rights amounts to the same type 
of constitutional crisis sparked by President Andrew Jackson in 
the 1830s.  The Canadian federal government’s refusal to abide 
by the constitutional rulings of the Supreme Court is also a blow 
in the face of Aboriginal Peoples who have historically attempted 
to work with the federal government to find a solution. 
 
 38 BUSINESS COUNCIL OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, THE BRITISH COLUMBIA TREATY 
PROCESS: A ROAD MAP FOR FURTHER PROGRESS (2004), available at http://www.bcbc.com/ 
archive/FinalTreatyPaper_may2004.pdf. 
 39 Amongst the most important decisions on Aboriginal rights in the 1990’s were R. 
v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R 1075 (Can.); R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (Can.); R. 
v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 (Can.). 
 40 Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1010. 
 41 Id. at 1014. 
 42 Janice G.A.E. Switlo, In a Perfect World, at 10, at http://www.ualberta.ca/ 
NATIVESTUDIES/LegalPDF/In a perfect world.pdf (stating that a letter from Hon. 
Robert Nault, Minister of Indian And Northern Affairs, to Phil Fontaine, National First 
Nations Chief, that “Canada was not prepared to change the Comprehensive Land Claims 
policy” in response to First Nation’s pressure.). 
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For example, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 
had the monumental task of shedding light on the history of 
dispossession of Aboriginal Peoples in Canada and making 
recommendations to the federal government on how past wrongs 
could be resolved.43  The commissioners concluded that current 
levels of poverty and underdevelopment are directly linked to the 
dispossession of Indigenous Peoples from their lands and the de-
legitimization of their institutions of society and governance.44  
The commissioners also concluded that land and governance 
questions needed to be resolved in a meaningful way.45  The 
entire last volume of the Royal Commission’s five-volume report 
to the federal government was dedicated to the Commission’s 
recommendations for possible resolution.46  In addition to its 
comprehensive recommendations, the Royal Commission 
highlighted the urgency and volatility of the situation and 
emphasized the need for timely and fundamental changes.47 
The federal government’s response to the Commission’s 
efforts exemplifies the federal government’s unwillingness to 
recognize Aboriginal Title and Rights.  In “Gathering Strength,” 
which speaks of “a renewed partnership with Aboriginal People 
and governments,”48 and its response in “Agenda for Action with 
First Nations,”49 the government claimed its willingness to 
develop a partnership with Indigenous Peoples.  Yet, the way the 
government envisioned the “partnership,” Indigenous Peoples 
would have had to recognize the existing land tenure system and 
abide by the very policies that the Royal Commission so 
emphatically discredited in its study.50  This “partnership” was 
therefore nothing more than the government’s endorsement of 
the status quo.  Despite the efforts of the Royal Commission and 
its subsequent findings, the federal government chose to continue 
on as before and endorsed policies like the 1973 and 1986 
 
 43 See generally Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, supra note 27. 
 44 See Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1 Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples §§ 11.2-11.4 (1996), 
available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/sgmm_e.html. 
 45 See Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 2 Report of the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples §§ 4-6 (1996), available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/ 
sgmm_e.html. 
 46 See Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 5 Report of the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples (1996), available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/sgmm_e. 
html. 
 47 See id. § 2. 
 48 Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Gathering Strength: Canada’s 
Aboriginal Action Plan (1997), available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/gs/chg_e.html. 
 49 Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Agenda for Action with First 
Nations (1998), available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/gs/agn_e.html. 
 50 See generally ABORIGINAL RIGHTS COALITION, BLIND SPOTS: AN EXAMINATION OF 
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO THE REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON 
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES (Patricia Sherlock ed., 2001). 
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Comprehensive Claims Policies that subject its Indigenous 
populations to subjugation and suffering. 
C. Continuing Violations of International Human Rights 
The growing gap between the findings of the Royal 
Commission and the rulings of the Supreme Court of Canada on 
the one hand, and the actions of the federal government on the 
other, drew the attention of numerous international human 
rights bodies.  In December of 1998, the United Nations 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights presented its 
concluding observations on the reports submitted by the 
government of Canada pursuant to Articles 16 and 17 of the 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.51  In its 
report, the Committee made reference to the disparity between 
the living conditions for non-indigenous and indigenous 
Canadians: 
3.  The Committee notes that, for the past five years, Canada has been 
ranked at the top of the United Nations Development Programme’s 
Human Development Index (HDI). . . . 
. . . . 
17.  The Committee is greatly concerned at the gross disparity 
between Aboriginal [P]eople and the majority of Canadians with 
respect to the enjoyment of Covenant rights.  There has been little or 
no progress in the alleviation of social and economic deprivation 
among Aboriginal [P]eople. . . . 
18.  The Committee views with concern the direct connection between 
Aboriginal economic marginalization and the ongoing dispossession of 
Aboriginal [P]eople from their lands, as recognized by RCAP, and 
endorses the recommendations of RCAP that policies which violate 
Aboriginal treaty obligations and the extinguishment, conversion or 
giving up of Aboriginal rights and title should on no account be 
pursued by the State Party. . . .52 
The Committee, concerned about the poor standard of living 
among Aboriginal Peoples, the inadequate food and housing, the 
inadequate legal protection, and the mass unemployment, found 
Canada to be in violation of the Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights.53  The following year, the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee reviewed the fourth periodic report 
submitted by Canada and came to similar conclusions: 
The Committee notes that, as the State party acknowledged, the 
situation of the [A]boriginal [P]eoples remains ‘the most pressing 
 
 51 See generally U.N. ESCOR, 19th Sess., 57th mtg. U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.31 
(1998). 
 52 Id. at 2, 4. 
 53 Id. at 4. 
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human rights issue facing Canadians’.  In this connection, the 
Committee is particularly concerned that the State party has not yet 
implemented the recommendations of the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP).  With reference to the conclusion by RCAP 
that without a greater share of lands and resources institutions of 
aboriginal self-government will fail, the Committee emphasizes that 
the right to self-determination requires, inter alia, that all peoples 
must be able to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources 
and that they may not be deprived of their own means of 
subsistence . . . .54 
Since then, the United Nations Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has noted similar 
concerns with regard to Canada’s policies on land rights and self-
government.55  Despite repeated findings of human rights 
violations regarding Indigenous Peoples in Canada, the 
Canadian government has done nothing to act in accordance with 
the recommendations of the various United Nations human 
rights bodies. 
D. Exploring Alternative Avenues 
A growing number of Indigenous Nations from Canada are 
attempting to draw the international community’s attention to 
the federal government’s violations of international law.  
Although international human rights bodies, such as the United 
Nations, have repeatedly found Canada to be in violation of 
international law, these bodies lack the power enforcing their 
decisions at the international level.56  Thus, Indigenous Peoples 
in Canada are now faced with the challenge of remedying the 
constitutional crisis facing them and are attempting on their own 
to right the wrongs recognized by international human rights 
organizations. 
One avenue considered by Indigenous Peoples and 
organizations is a return to the Canadian courts for judicial 
remedies.  There are some Aboriginal Title and rights cases 
currently underway before Canadian courts.57  However, it takes 
over ten years and substantial funds for an Aboriginal Title case 
to wind its way through the Canadian judicial system.  
 
 54 Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the 
Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. Human Rights 
Committee, 65th Sess., at ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.105 (1999). 
 55 Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, U.N. GAOR, 
57th Sess., at 58, U.N. Doc. A/57/18 (2002). 
 56 See, e.g., U. N. ESCOR, supra note 51, at 2, 4. 
 57 See, e.g., Brian Thom, Rising to the Test: Meeting Lamer’s Tests for Aboriginal 
Rights and Title After Delgamuukw, Meeting of the Canadian Anthropology Society, at 
http://home.istar.ca/~bthom/tests.htm (May 1999) (discussing several recent cases 
regarding Aboriginal Title.). 
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Hampered by an inability to pay the necessary fees to 
successfully win a judgment and the need for quicker resolution, 
most Aboriginal Nations are unable to utilize the Canadian court 
option. 
A number of Indigenous Peoples, unable to wait ten years for 
a resolution of their rights, have taken alternative actions to 
assert and protect their Aboriginal Title.  For example, many 
Indigenous Peoples have actively tried to stop the exploitation of 
natural resources on their lands by blocking access to mining and 
logging sites.58  In response, affected corporations seek 
injunctions, those are interim remedied in which the courts 
weigh the economic loss of the corporations against the interests 
of Indigenous Peoples.59  Based on a minimal showing of 
hardship and often without a hearing, the injunctions are 
granted.  Once these injunctions are granted, Indigenous Nations 
are then faced with a decision: obey the order or be found in 
contempt of court.60  Unable to get the federal and provincial 
governments to recognize their rights, Indigenous Peoples across 
Canada now face criminal prosecution for exercising what the 
Supreme Court of Canada has already deemed a constitutional 
right. 
Another avenue for Indigenous Peoples is to enlist the 
international community.  By lobbying for the international 
recognition of indigenous rights, pointing to Canadian violations 
of international human rights laws, and calling for the 
enforcement of the financial and social responsibilities of 
international corporations that are active on Indigenous lands, 
the Indigenous Peoples of Canada strive to win recognition of 
their Aboriginal Title and rights from the international 
community. 
III. CHALLENGING THE STATUS QUO:  ASSERTING INDIGENOUS 
PROPERTY RIGHTS ON AN INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
As alluded to above, Indigenous Peoples adapt to changing 
realities and use different avenues to maintain their inherent 
rights.  Indigenous rights, especially property rights, are sui 
generis, defined by respective Indigenous laws, which maintain a 
strong connection to traditional territories.61  Indigenous rights 
are extremely multifaceted, containing social, cultural, 
environmental and economic dimensions.  Per their customs, 
 
 58 See Julia E. Lawn, The John Doe Injunction in Mass Protest Cases, 56 U. TORONTO 
FAC. L. REV. 101 (1998). 
 59 See id. at 104. 
 60 See id. 
 61 Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1014. 
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Indigenous Peoples see and assert their rights in a holistic 
manner.  However, because of ever-changing political and legal 
climates, Indigenous Peoples have been forced to venture into the 
unchartered territory of international law to assert their 
proprietary interests and win recognition of their inherent rights. 
A. How International Trade Agreements Threaten to 
Undermine Indigenous Rights 
The 1990s was an important decade in terms of recognition 
of Indigenous rights, both in Canada and across the Americas.  
Today, many new Latin American constitutions not only 
recognize, but also protect Indigenous rights and jurisdictions.62  
The 1990s also saw an increased strengthening of international 
trade law regimes.  One of the most significant was the creation 
of the WTO and the passage of its new Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, which strengthens sanctions and enforcement 
mechanisms for international trade law.63 
Yet, despite these gains, there were losses in the 
international arena.  In North America, the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force on January 1, 1994 
and proved to be a setback for the recognition of Indigenous 
rights.64  The same day of its enactment, Indigenous Peoples in 
the Southern Highlands of Mexico staged the Zapatista uprising 
in protest.65  The reason for the protest lied in Mexico’s 
elimination of all constitutional protections for collective 
Indigenous land rights in order to comport with the membership 
requirements of NAFTA.66  NAFTA secures increased corporate 
access to natural resources and threatens to freeze 
environmental, social, and human rights standards. 
Chapter 11 of NAFTA, the Investor State Chapter, allows 
international corporations to sue states for expropriation or loss 
of their investments.67  If a regulation deprives a company of the 
 
 62 See Theodore McDonald, Indigenous Rights: Configuring Citizenships, REVISTA: 
HARVARD REVIEW OF LATIN AMERICA (2003), available at http://drclas.fas. 
harvard.edu/revista/tcontents_issue.php?issue=15&article=291; North American Free 
Trade Agreement, Jan. 1, 1994, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1110, 32 I.L.M. 289. 
 63 For more information on the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding, please 
visit http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm. 
 64 See WILLIAM J. DAVEY, PINE & SWINE: CANADA-UNITED STATES TRADE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT: THE FTA EXPERIENCE AND NAFTA PROSPECTS 2 (1996). 
 65 See Amelia M. DeAngelis, Note, Coffee, Mexico’s Other Bean: An Examination of 
the Globalization of the Coffee Industry, its Impact on Mexican Villages, and the 
Possibility of Surviving the Grind, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 887 (2004).  See also 
http://www.abstractdynamics.org/archives/2004/01/02/zapatista_nafta.html. 
 66 Id. 
 67 North American Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 1, 1994, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1110, 
32 I.L.M. 289. 
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right to profit from its investment, or even invest in the first 
place, the foreign corporation is entitled to fair market value 
compensation for the “expropriation” of its profits.68  NAFTA 
provisions on investment and the rights of investors contained in 
Chapter 11 not only grant preferential treatment to foreign 
investors but also guarantees them the right to invest despite 
domestic laws and regulations.  Moreover, in the case of a change 
in public policy (i.e. environmental protection) corporations can 
claim expropriation for the mere loss of opportunities.69  Thus, 
foreign investors now have the ability to sue countries where 
they have lost profits, or have been prohibited from investing in 
the first place, even where domestic companies could not do the 
same.70 
As a result of international trade agreements like NAFTA, 
Indigenous Peoples are in direct competition with multinational 
corporations for control over their lands.  While multinational 
firms can sue even for the expropriation of future profits, 
Indigenous Peoples still have not been able to secure the 
implementation of their ancestral land rights.  Indigenous 
Peoples are still fighting to stop the expropriation and third 
party alienation of their lands and resources.  Unfortunately, 
Indigenous Peoples are fighting this fight without much in the 
way of ammunition.  With no remuneration rights and with few 
efficient remedies available to enforce recognized rights, 
Indigenous Peoples are fighting an uphill battle against the 
illegal expropriation of their lands by multinational companies. 
IV. THE SOFTWOOD LUMBER DISPUTE: DEALING WITH 
INDIGENOUS PROPERTY RIGHTS 
A. The Perspective of the Indigenous Peoples of British 
Columbia 
The Indigenous Peoples of the South Central Interior of 
British Columbia have never given up their land rights.  Even as 
far back as 1910, the Indian tribes of the Interior of British 
Columbia gathered to call upon the then Prime Minister of 
Canada, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, to recognize their proprietary 
interests: 
 
 68 Id. 
 69 For example, on August 25, 2000, a NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal ordered the 
government of Mexico to pay an American company, Metalclad, almost seventeen million 
U.S. dollars because a Mexican community refused to allow the company to operate a 
waste disposal site on ecologically sensitive land.  Stephen L. Kass & Jean McCarroll, The 
‘Metalclad’ Decision Under NAFTA’s Chapter 11, N.Y.L.J., October 27, 2000, at 3. 
 70 North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 67, arts. 1115-38. 
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The whites made a government in Victoria . . . . At this time they did 
not deny the Indian tribes owned the whole country and everything in 
it. . . . We trusted the whites and waited patiently for their chiefs to 
declare their intentions toward us and our lands. . . .  They told us to 
have no fear, the queen’s laws would prevail in this country, and 
everything would be well for the Indians here. . . . They let us think 
this would be done soon . . . .71 
They also made it very clear that they did not accept reservations 
as a replacement for their rights to the land: 
This was their proposal not ours, and we never accepted these 
reservations as settlement for anything, nor did we sign any papers or 
make any treaties about same.  They thought we would be satisfied 
with this, but we never have been satisfied and never will be until we 
get our rights.72 
When the Supreme Court of Canada finally recognized 
Aboriginal Title in 1997,73 Indigenous Peoples in the Interior of 
British Columbia celebrated.  Expectations were that the 
Canadian government would act promptly to implement the 
Supreme Court decision, just as the government of Australia had 
done by passing the Native Title Act one year after its High 
Court recognized inherent Indigenous land rights.74  The Interior 
Alliance, an organization consisting of Interior Tribes of British 
Columbia, called on the federal and provincial governments to 
recognize and implement Aboriginal Title.75  As discussed 
previously, that recognition and implementation never came.  So 
in 1999, the leaders of the Interior Tribes decided that it was 
time to take action. 
B. Attacking the Lumber Industry:  The Fight in British 
Columbia 
The dominant industry in the Interior of British Columbia is 
forestry,76 and, for the past 50 years, the majority of land tenure 
has been allocated to large integrated wood-processing 
corporations holding long-term renewable licenses.77  The 
 
 71 Memorial from the Chiefs of the Shuswap, Okanagan and Couteau Tribes of 
British Columbia, to Sir Wilfrid Laurier 3 (August 25, 1910), available at http://www.sec 
wepemc.org/memorial.htm. 
 72 Id. at 4. 
 73 Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1014. 
 74 See Mabo v. Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
 75 See Richard Cowan, Environmentalists, Tribes Seek Duties on Canada Lumbar, 
Canada Forest Conservation News & Information, available at http://forests.org/archive 
/canada/entrseek.htm (May 11, 2001). 
 76 British Columbia Ministry of Management Services, British Columbia 
Manufacturing Shipments 1997-2004, available at http://www.bcstats.gov.bc.ca/data/dd/ 
handout/mannaics.pdf (showing that wood and paper make up over 50% of British 
Columbia’s manufacturing shipments). 
 77 Roland Stiven, Social Involvement in Forestry: Eight Cases Studies from British 
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recognition of Aboriginal Title would therefore require a major 
reallocation of land tenure away from these corporations.  To win 
recognition of proprietary rights in the lumber industry would 
not only equate recognition of Aboriginal Title but would also 
serve to protect the natural resources Indigenous Peoples have 
relied on for so long. 
In their efforts to assert Aboriginal Title via the lumber 
industry, some Indian Nations issued logging permits pursuant 
to their jurisdiction under Section 35 of the Canadian 
Constitution.78  These permits allowed the permit holder to log on 
a small cut block according to the highest environmental 
standards.  No provincial permits were acquired.  In September 
1999, a number of Indian bands, including the Adams Lake, 
Neskonlith and Spallumcheen Indian bands, went logging with 
the authorization and in the name of their Secwepemc Nation.79  
Similarly the Okanagan Indian Band went logging in the name 
of the Okanagan Nation. The province of British Columbia 
charged them with stealing the timber.80  In return, the Indian 
bands brought a defense, arguing that they had property rights 
in the timber and asserted Aboriginal Title as their defense.81 
The case regarding the property rights of Interior Tribes over 
timber will be heard in the British Columbia Supreme Court in 
2006.  While the final outcome is years away, the Aboriginal 
Peoples have already won one major battle in British Columbia v. 
Okanagan Indian Band.82  Due to the socio-economic status of 
many of the tribes involved, the Indian bands argued that they 
were not in a financial position to properly fight a case of 
substantial national importance.83  The British Columbia Court 
of Appeal agreed.84  The Court held that the provincial 
government would have to pay for the Indian plaintiffs’ legal 
costs.85  The Supreme Court of Canada, finding the case to be of 
national importance, upheld the cost decision.86 
Yet, with no final ruling in sight and an initial trial set to 
 
Columbia and Quebec, The Caledonia Centre for Social Development, at 
http://www.caledonia.org.uk/socialland/canada.htm (Aug. 2000). 
 78 Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution guarantees Aboriginal rights.  See 
Richard Spaulding, Peoples as National Minorities: A Review of Will Kymlicka’s 
Arguments for Aboriginal Rights from a Self-Determination Perspective, 47 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 35 (1997). 
 79 British Columbia v. Jules, [2001] 92 C.R.R. 2d 319. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 [2003] 3 S.C.R. 371. 
 83 Id. at 373. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
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start seven years after the logging took place, the issue of who 
controls the forests of British Columbia might be sidelined in the 
Canadian courts for decades.  During this time, the integrated 
wood processing corporations, with government support, may 
continue to exploit and potentially exhaust the forestry resources 
in the respective Indigenous territories.  Therefore, while 
Indigenous Peoples continue to seek recognition of their 
Aboriginal Title and rights in the Canadian Courts, they 
continue to look for other avenues through which they can assert 
and protect their property rights. 
C. Beyond British Columbia: The Fight Against the Lumber 
Industry and the United States 
The Interior Alliance, deciding to take its struggle to the 
international level, turned to the United States.  The U.S. is the 
main export market for timber and lumber from Canada, with a 
major share originating from the Interior of British Columbia.87  
The year 2000, when representatives of the Interior Tribes first 
headed to the United States, was just the right year to start 
discussing forestry imports from Canada and the associated 
violations of Indigenous rights.  The Softwood Lumber 
Agreement imposing export quotas on Canadian lumber 
producers, entered into force on April 1, 1996, was set to expire 
on March 31, 2001.88 
In 2000, it was already clear that both countries wanted the 
quota system to end and that the Softwood Lumber Agreement 
would not be extended.  Canadian producers were pushing for 
free trade in lumber and unlimited access to the U.S. market.89  
The U.S. lumber industry, claiming injury from cheap Canadian 
lumber imports, pushed Senators from the most affected U.S. 
states for a stronger stand on Canadian lumber imports and 
fundamental changes in the land tenure and wood allocation 
system.90  Environmental groups that opposed clear-cutting and 
 
 87 The Interior of British Columbia is not only a stronghold of Aboriginal Title, but it 
is also the heartland of softwood lumber exploitation.  Canadian softwood lumber exports 
to the United States amount to over six billion dollars annually, making it the single-
largest trade good between the two countries.  See International Trade Canada, Softwood 
Lumber, at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/eicb/softwood/intro-en.asp (last modified March 
26, 2004).  More than 40% of the exports come from British Columbia, and the majority of 
that lumber originates from the traditional territories of Indigenous Peoples in the 
Interior.  See British Columbia Ministry of Management Services, supra note 76.  See also 
Greg Mastel, Stopping the Giveaway of Canada’s Forests: Establishing True Free Trade in 
Softwood Lumber (Oct. 2000), at http://www.newamerica.net/Download_Docs/pdfs/ 
Pub_File_628_1.pdf. 
 88 See Greg Mastel, supra note 87, at 8. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Sign on Letter from United State Senate to US Department Of Commerce and 
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forestry practices in Canada supported this position.91 
Groups from Canada and the United States submitted their 
concerns in response to a call for positions regarding the 
Softwood Lumber Agreement issued by the U.S. Trade 
Representative.92  For the first time in the history of 
international trade disputes, Indigenous Nations from Canada 
also submitted their positions.93  The Interior Alliance made a 
submission based on Aboriginal Title to their traditional 
territories, detailing the refusal of the Canadian government to 
let them share in the management of the land and its resources.94 
At the same time, the Interior Alliance also lobbied the U.S. 
Congress, which was more understanding of the threats to 
Indigenous rights than the Canadian government had ever been.  
The co-chairs of the Human Rights Caucus of the House of 
Representatives circulated a special sign-on letter entitled 
“Canadian Logging Threatens First Nations Habitats: Support 
Native Peoples’ Right for Self-Determination in Canada.”95  This 
letter stated “[i]t appears that while (Native) rights are being 
defined in the court system that Canadian logging companies are 
trampling them by clear-cutting these forest areas for profit, at 
the same time eviscerating valuable wildlife habitat and 
medicinal plants that are used by these people.”96 
 
United States Trade Representative, (July 17, 2000) (on file with author). 
 91 See, e.g., Letter from Northwest Ecosystem Alliance, et al., to The Hon. Marc 
Racicot, Special Ambassador, U.S./Canada Softwood Lumber (February 13, 2002), 
available at http://albertawilderness.ca/News/NR2002/NR020213/LET020213NKNB/ 
LET020213NKNB.htm. 
 92 Request for Public Comment Regarding Softwood Lumber Practices in Canada 
and Softwood Lumber Trade Between the United States and Canada, Office of the United 
States Trade Representative, 65 Fed. Reg. 11363 (2000). 
 93 It was important for Indigenous Peoples to be involved in the U.S.-Canada 
Softwood Lumber Dispute because it touched the core of their livelihood and deeply 
impacted their Aboriginal Title and rights.  Canadian softwood lumber imports also 
impact Native American tribes in the United States: through self-determination and self-
rule many tribes, especially those in the Pacific Northwest, have gained control over 
forestry on their lands.  Those tribes have developed sustainable forest management 
practices that make it impossible for them to compete with cheap Canadian lumber 
imports that neither take into account Indigenous rights nor environmental standards 
when harvested.  See, e.g., Ernie Atencio, After a Heavy Harvest and a Death, Navajo 
Forestry Realigns with Culture, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, available at http://www.hcn.org/ 
servlets/hcn.URLRemapper/1994/oct31/dir/wr4.html (stating that BIA’s interest in Indian 
self-determination has led to the Navajo Indians saving the rest of their forests). 
 94 See Canadian First Nations Join Together in Washington, DC to Present Views on 
Softwood Lumber Agreement, KAHTOU NEWS, May 2000, available at http://www. 
kahtou.com/images/lumber.html. 
 95 Sign-on Letter from Tom Lantos et al., entitled Canadian Logging Threatens First 
Nations Habitats: Support Native Peoples’ Right for Self-Determination in Canada (2000) 
(on file with author). 
 96 Id. 
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D. The Softwood Lumber Dispute:  United States v. Canada 
The U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Dispute has been one of 
the most contentious trade issues between these two neighboring 
countries in the past few decades.97  In the early 1980s, the U.S. 
lumber industry organized under the Coalition for Fair Lumber 
Imports (CFLI).98  CFLI argued that the Canadian government 
was, through non-competitive allocation, subsidizing the timber 
production of Canadian producers.99  At issue was “whether fees 
charged by provincial authorities to lumber firms to harvest trees 
on public land (stumpage rights) [were] artificially low and 
constitute[d] countervailable subsidies.”100  In response to CFLI’s 
contentions, the U.S. Department of Commerce investigated and 
found that the actions of the provincial governments might be 
inflicting material injury on U.S. industry.101  In what is known 
as Softwood Lumber I, the Department of Commerce found that 
stumpage was a good but was unable to conclude that the 
Canadian government significantly subsidized its industry.102 
The U.S. lumber industry was undeterred, however, and 
brought another complaint in 1986: Softwood Lumber II.103  Due 
to changes in its interpretation of U.S. countervailing duties law, 
the Department of Commerce departed from its decision three 
years earlier and found “Canada’s timber pricing and allocation 
policies [did] constitute a countervailable subsidy.”104  Facing a 
preliminary decision to impose a provincial duty of fifteen 
percent or more, the Canadian government entered a last minute 
agreement in December 1986 which imposed a fifteen percent 
 
 97 Debates of the Senate (Hansard), 1st Session, 38th Parliament, Volume 142, Issue 
11, November 2, 2004, available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/chambus/senate/ 
deb-e/011db_2004-11-02-E.htm?Language=E&Parl=38&Ses=1 (statement from Hon. Jack 
Austin stating that “[g]iven the dependence of the British Columbia economy on the 
United States market, the long dispute with the lumber industry in the United States 
over their trade protectionism and claims of harm to their industry goes on and on and 
continues to damage B.C. interests and Canada-United States trade relations.”). 
 98 GEORGE HOBERG & PAUL HOWE, LAW, KNOWLEDGE AND NATIONAL INTERESTS IN 
TRADE DISPUTES: THE SOFTWOOD LUMBER CASE 4 (Univ. of British Columbia, Inst. of Int’l 
Relations, Working Paper No. 29, 1999), available at http://www.iir.ubc.ca/ 
pdffiles/webwp29.pdf. 
 99 See Letter from Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports to Undersecretary of 
Commerce Grant Aldonas and Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Peter Allgeler (June 16, 
2003), available at http://www.ftlc.org/index.cfm?Section=2&DownloadID=79 (discussing 
need for negotiations on subsidized and dumped Canadian lumber). 
 100 Gilbert Gagne, The NAFTA and the Softwood Lumber Dispute: What Kind of 
Canada-U.S. Partnership? 3 (November 2002), at http://www.unites.uqam.ca/gric/pdf/ 
Cahier_Gagne.pdf. 
 101 Id. at 12. 
 102 Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determinations on Certain Softwood Lumber 
Products from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159 (1983). 
 103 Gilbert Gagne, supra note 100, at 7. 
 104 Id. at 8. 
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export tax on all softwood lumber exported to the U.S.105  After 
this agreement expired in 1991, another countervailing duty 
investigation was launched.  In 1992, following the conclusion of 
its investigation, the Department of Commerce imposed a six and 
a half percent duty on Canadian imports.106 
Canada launched three appeals against the duty 
determination, including one under the terms of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),107 but no decision was 
ever adopted or publicized.  This was primarily due to the weak 
dispute settlement procedures that were then in place.  At that 
time, two bi-national panels had been set up under the Canada-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) – one to look at the 
question of injury, another to look at the question of subsidies.108  
Due to a lack of evidence, neither panel agreed with the decisions 
of the U.S. authorities and sent the cases back for further 
consideration.109 
The Department of Commerce maintained its decision to 
impose a duty on Canadian imports.110  After the bi-national 
panel rejected it once more, the Department of Commerce 
resorted to a procedure provided for in the CUSFTA, which 
allowed it to bring its case before an Extraordinary Challenge 
Committee.111  Voting along national lines, the Committee 
rejected the U.S. appeal in 1994.112  The United States had to 
rescind its countervailing duties and frustrations with the 
partisan dispute settlement process were great.113 
In 1994, when Canadian exports to the U.S. hit a record 16.4 
billion board feet, the U.S. industry proclaimed its readiness to 
launch another countervailing duty investigation.114  Instead, bi-
national discussions between the U.S. and Canada were 
launched in 1995 and an agreement, now known as the Softwood 
Lumber Agreement, was reached.  This agreement imposed a 
quota system that allowed British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, 
and Quebec to export 14.7 billion board feet of lumber to the U.S. 
 
 105 Id. 
 106 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber 
Products from Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,570 (1992). 
 107 Gagne, supra note 100, at 9-11. 
 108 Id. at 11. 
 109 See id. at 12. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 13. 
 112 See DAVEY, supra note 64, at 232. 
 113 Gagne, supra note 100, at 13-14. 
 114 U.S.-Canada Trade Agreement Timeline, 1982-Present (Random Lengths 
Publications, Inc.), March 29, 2005, at 7, available at http://www.randomlengths.com/ 
base.asp?s1=In_Depth&s2=U.S.-Canada_Trade_Dispute&s3=U.S.-Canada_Trade_Agree 
ment_Timeline_1995-present. 
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annually without penalty.115  The Softwood Lumber Agreement 
went into effect on April 1, 1996 and expired on March 31, 
2001.116  The following day, on April 1, 2001, the U.S. softwood 
lumber industry, represented by CFLI, brought its petition 
alleging that, 
[t]he Government of Canada and Canadian provincial governments 
are providing countervailable subsidies with respect to the export, 
manufacture and production of softwood lumber (the “Subject 
Merchandise”), within the meaning of Section 701 and 702(b) of the 
Tariff Act of 1930 (the “Tariff Act”), 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671 and 
1671a(b).117 
1. First Indigenous Submissions to International Trade 
Tribunals 
In May 2001, the U.S. Department of Commerce once again 
began an investigation into softwood lumber imports from 
Canada (Softwood Lumber III).118  This was the first 
investigation into the subsidization of Canadian lumber since the 
recognition of Aboriginal rights to land and resources in the 
Delgamuukw Decision.  Understanding the pressure that free 
trade in natural resources was putting on Aboriginal lands and 
economies, the Aboriginal Peoples of the Interior decided to 
involve themselves in the dispute.  They filed substantive 
submissions with the U.S. Department of Commerce, alleging 
that the non-recognition of Aboriginal Title constituted a subsidy 
under international trade law.119 
The investigative authorities, although interested in this 
novel issue, lacked both the expertise and the time to investigate 
these additional subsidy claims in detail.  Instead, the 
Department of Commerce found that the potential subsidies for 
the non-recognition of Aboriginal Title and non-implementation 
of treaties and environmental provisions would be included in the 
overall market value: “[T]o the extent that Canadian lumber 
companies are being provided with stumpage from provincial 
governments, we are measuring that financial contribution in our 
preliminary determination based upon a market rate for 
 
 115 Id. at 8. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Petition for the Imposition of Antidumping Duties Pursuant to Section 731 of the 
Tariff Act of 1930 as Amended, at 1, In Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from 
Canada, USITC Inv. No. A-122-838 (April 2, 2001), available at http://www.dbtrade.com/ 
casework/softwood/Common%20Volume.pdf. 
 118 See Gagne, supra note 100, at 20. 
 119 Charles M. Gastle, Shadows of a Talking Circle: Aboriginal Advocacy Before 
International Institutions and Tribunals, at 31 (Dec. 2002), at http://www.esteycentre 
.ca/Shadowsofatalkingcircle_final.pdf. 
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stumpage.”120  The U.S. Department of Commerce then went on 
to deliver its preliminary decision in the Softwood Lumber III 
and imposed countervailing duties of 19.31 percent on all 
Softwood Lumber Imports from Canada.121 
Throughout Softwood Lumber III, Canada openly opposed 
submissions by Indigenous Peoples, arguing that questions of 
land rights had to be first dealt with in Canadian courts.122  
Knowing that Aboriginal Title cases take decades to litigate, the 
federal government was attempting to perpetuate its “business 
as usual” approach: ignore the already constitutionally 
recognized Aboriginal rights within the territories at issue and 
encourage the exploitation of the natural resources by Canadian 
companies.  Aboriginal Peoples understood that they had to 
continue to assert their rights in venues outside Canada in order 
to stop the third party alienation and exploitation of their lands 
and resources.  Despite Canada’s attempt to block indigenous 
participation in the Softwood Labor Dispute, organizations like 
the Interior Alliance pressed on to ensure that their voices were 
heard. 
2. Rejection of the “Business as Usual” Approach: 
Strengthening the Indigenous Position in the Softwood 
Labor Dispute 
Interior Alliance’s position that it had a right to continue 
participating in the Softwood Lumber Dispute despite Canada’s 
opposition was strengthened by rulings of Canadian courts 
rejecting Canada’s “business as usual” approach.”  One such 
decision, Haida Nation v. British Columbia, rendered on 
February 27, 2002 by the Court of Appeal for British Columbia, 
further defined Canada’s legal obligations towards Indigenous 
Peoples.123  In its holding that indigenous interests have to be 
accommodated and taken into account on a provincial level, the 
Court inferred that indigenous rights must also be accounted for 
on both the national and international level.124 
The decision was especially relevant to the Softwood Lumber 
 
 120 Id. at 34. 
 121 Notice of Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 
Preliminary Affirmative Political Circumstances Determination, and Alignment of Final 
Countervailing Duty Determination with Final Antidumping Duty Determination: 
Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 66 Fed. Reg. 43,186 (2001). 
 122 For more information on Canada’s opposition, see Arthur Manuel and Nicole 
Schabus, Aboriginal Peoples v. Companies and Governments: Who are the Real Stewards 
of the Land and Forests? 4 (2002), available at http://www.iiirm.org/publications/ 
Articles%20Reports%20Papers/NYU%20Trade%20Conference/Schabus-
Manuel%20Forestry%20Paper.pdf. 
 123 [2002] B.C.A.C. Lexis 130 ¶¶ 58, 60. 
 124 Id. ¶ 58. 
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Dispute and is deserving of brief discussion here.  The case dealt 
with the replacement of tree farm licenses and subsequent 
transfer of lands to large forestry firms on Haida Gwaii.125  Haida 
Gwaii is an island claimed in its totality by the Indigenous Haida 
people who have lived there for many generations.126  The Haida, 
claiming Aboriginal Title over the area, had always opposed any 
grant of right over their land.  For a number of years leading up 
to the case, the Haida had consistently expressed their objections 
to the Crown about the rate at which the old-growth forests of 
Haida Gwaii were being logged, the methods of logging being 
used, and the environmental effects of the logging on the land, 
watersheds, fish, and wildlife.127 
Yet, true to its “business as usual” policy, the Crown and 
Weyerhauser Company Ltd., a named co-defendant in the Haida 
Nation case, failed to recognize the proprietary interests of the 
Haida.  In its opinion, the Court of Appeal for British Columbia 
condemned this “business as usual” approach: 
[T]he Crown Provincial and Weyerhaeuser were in breach of an 
enforceable, legal and equitable duty to consult with the Haida people 
and to seek an accommodation with them at the time when the 
processes were under way for a replacement of T.F.L. 39 and Block 6 
and for a transfer of T.F.L. 39 from MacMillan Bloedel to 
Weyerhaeuser in the year 2000.  That enforceable legal and equitable 
duty has continued from then until the present time and will continue 
until the Haida title and rights are determined by treaty or by a Court 
of competent jurisdiction. . . . 
. . . . 
However, I would grant a declaration to the petitioners that the 
Crown Provincial and Weyerhaeuser have now, and had in 1999 and 
2000, and earlier, a legally enforceable duty to the Haida people to 
consult with them in good faith and to endeavour to seek workable 
accommodations between the aboriginal interests of the Haida people, 
on the one hand, and the short term and long term objectives of the 
Crown and Weyerhaeuser to manage T.F.L. 39 and Block 6 in 
accordance with the public interest, both aboriginal and non-
aboriginal, on the other hand.128 
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of Canada 
affirmed the lower court’s ruling on a duty to consult with regard 
to the Crown: 
The government’s duty to consult with Aboriginal [P]eoples and 
accommodate their interests is grounded in the honour of the Crown. 
 
 125 Id. ¶¶ 20-23 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Haida, [2002] B.C.A.C. Lexis 130, ¶¶ 58 & 60. 
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 . . . . 
The jurisprudence of this Court supports the view that the duty to 
consult and accommodate is part of a process of fair dealing and 
reconciliation that begins with the assertion of sovereignty and 
continues beyond formal claims resolution.129 
The Supreme Court also held that the “honour of the Crown” 
could not be delegated and the legal responsibility for 
consultation and accommodation rested with the Crown.130  This 
does not mean, however, that third parties can never be liable to 
Aboriginal Peoples.  The court found that “[t]he fact that third 
parties are under no duty to consult or accommodate Aboriginal 
concerns does not mean that they can never be liable to 
Aboriginal [P]eoples.”131 
The importance of this ruling to the Interior Nation’s 
position with regard to the Softwood Lumber Dispute is clear.  In 
finding a duty to consult and accommodate Aboriginal Peoples, 
the Supreme Court supported the argument that the Canadian 
government’s refusal to recognize Aboriginal Title serves as a 
subsidy for Canadian lumber companies.  In other words, the 
“honour of the Crown,” clearly mandates that the Canadian 
government recognize the proprietary interests of Indigenous 
Peoples.  By failing to do so, the Canadian government is 
subsidizing corporations, allowing them to bypass their 
obligation of negotiation and remuneration.  In other words, by 
refusing to acknowledge Aboriginal Title, the Canadian 
government is subsidizing an entire industry and making it 
easier for Canadian companies to exploit the lands of Indigenous 
Peoples. 
V. THE WTO:  SETTING PRECEDENT ON SUBSIDIZATION 
Since the preliminary determination of the U.S. Department 
of Commerce in the Softwood Lumber Dispute, Canada has 
brought the Softwood Lumber dispute before the international 
trade tribunals.132  Dispute settlement panels have been set up 
under both the WTO and NAFTA to address Canada’s 
 
 129 Haida Nation v. British Columbia, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, 522, 528. 
 130 Id. at 521. 
 131 Id. at 539. 
 132 In April 2002, the U.S. Department of Commerce released its final determination 
on subsidies and on dumping Canadian softwood lumber imports to the United States.  
The Department imposed a countervailing duty of 19.34% and antidumping margins 
ranging between 2.26 and 15.83.  See Notice of Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty 
Determination and Final Negative Critical Circumstances: Certain Softwood Lumber 
Products from Canada, 67 Fed. Reg. 15,545 (2002); Notice of Final Determination of Sales 
at Less Than Fair Value: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 67 Fed. Reg. 
15,539 (2002).  For more information on WTO disputes please visit the WTO Dispute 
Settlement site at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm#2002. 
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complaints.133  The first panel set up under the WTO addressed 
the U.S. Department of Commerce’s preliminary determination 
imposing countervailing duties on certain softwood lumber from 
Canada.  A second panel addressing the final countervailing duty 
determination soon followed. 
A. Canada Arguing for Corporate Rights 
The cases brought before the WTO by Canada disputing 
subsidization of softwood lumber have created important 
precedent as they were the first cases involving natural resource 
exploitation brought under the WTO’s new Dispute Settlement 
Understanding.  In its complaints, the government of Canada 
argued that the integrated wood-processing companies from 
Canada had quasi-proprietary interests in the timber growing on 
public lands in Aboriginal Title territories.134 
Attempting to move the entire natural resource exploitation  
sector outside the scope of countervailing duty investigations, 
Canada argued in favor of timber harvesters: 
Timber harvesters have the right to harvest timber from Crown lands 
by virtue of their tenures or licenses; they do not pay stumpage 
charges as remuneration to acquire this right.  Rather, a “stumpage 
charge” is a levy on the exercise of an existing right to harvest timber.  
Stumpage charges are properly viewed as a form of revenue collection 
that is the economic equivalent of a tax.135 
Canada argued that there should not be remuneration for 
the acquisition of the right to harvest timber.136  Instead of 
remuneration for the provision of public timber, it contended that 
it was merely collecting part of an economic rent, like a tax.137  
Thus, companies that harvested the lumber could acquire limited 
ownership through the general licensing agreement long before 
they met all statutory requirements, including the payment of 
stumpage.138  In other words, Canada tried to resurrect its 
already rejected contention that stumpage could not be subject to 
a countervailing duty because it was not a good.139  In doing so, 
 
 133 See DSB Establishes Panel to Examine Softwood Lumber Dispute, WTO NEWS, 
Dec. 5, 2001, at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news01_e/dsb_5dec01_e.htm; Status 
Report of Panel Proceedings: Active NAFTA Panel Reviews, at http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?ArticleID=616 (last modified July 25, 2003). 
 134 See Report of the Dispute Settlement Panel: United States - Preliminary 
Determinations With Respect To Certain Softwood Lumber From Canada, World Trade 
Organization, Doc. No. WT/DS236/R (2002), ¶¶ 1.1-1.3 [hereinafter WTO Panel Report], 
available at http://docsonline.wto.org. 
 135 Id. ¶ 4.117. 
 136 Id. ¶¶ 4.116-4.122. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 To reiterate, international trade tribunals have consistently found that stumpage 
MANUEL FINAL 6/21/2005 6:48 PM 
247 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 8:222 
the Canadian government was attempting to outmaneuver the 
imposition of a countervailing duty and the application of the 
WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement.140 
B. Indigenous Peoples Make Their Case 
In opposition to Canada’s arguments that integrated wood 
processing companies had quasi-proprietary interests in the 
timber on Aboriginal Title lands, the Interior Alliance argued in 
its amicus curiae brief that there could be no transfer of 
ownership until they had given their consent and received fair 
remuneration.141  Again, the Indigenous Peoples of Canada were 
forced to make their claim for Aboriginal Title and rights, despite 
the fact that the Canadian Constitution and Supreme Court had 
already recognized these rights.  One of the reasons why the 
Interior Alliance chose to once again make its case was the 
pending reality that, if Canada’s arguments were accepted by the 
WTO, it would have opened the way for free corporate access to 
natural resources within the traditional territories of Indigenous 
Peoples.142  Therefore, the Interior Alliance felt it needed to 
submit its argument that the Canadian government’s refusal to 
recognize Aboriginal Title constituted a subsidy. 
Canada has always argued for a restrictive interpretation of 
terms like “direct subsidies,” arguing that they could not be 
payments in kind because they were not a financial 
 
is a good.  In three prior countervailing duty investigations covering softwood lumber 
products from Canada, the U.S. Department of Commerce determined that stumpage 
programs involve the provision of a good.  See Final Negative Countervailing Duty 
Determinations: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada , 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159, 
24,167 (May 31, 1983); Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: 
Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada , 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453, 37,457 (Oct. 22, 
1986); Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber 
Products from Canada , 57 Fed. Reg. 22,570, (May 28, 1992).  In 1992, a GATT panel 
rejected Canada’s contention that stumpage cannot be countervailing because it is not a 
good.  See United States –Measures Affecting Imports of Softwood Lumber from Canada, 
GATT B.I.S.D., 40th Supp., (1993), at 358, ¶ 346-47 (Feb. 19, 1993), available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/gatt/91lumber.asp. 
 140 For more information on the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Agreement see http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/scm_e.htm. 
 141 See Brief of Amici Curiae Interior Alliance Indigenous Nations, WTO Panel on US 
– Preliminary Determinations with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada 
(No. DS-236) (2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter Interior Alliance Amicus Brief]. 
 142 If Canada’s arguments had been accepted by the WTO, Aboriginal proprietary 
interests would have gotten lost somewhere in the process of resource distribution and 
would not form part of any economic equation or remuneration scheme.  Under the guise 
that they were simply collecting economic rent, the provinces could, in the future, have 
continued to keep Indigenous Peoples out of all remuneration schemes.  At present, 
Aboriginal Peoples are not remunerated for their ownership and have not passed on their 
ownership in the timber to the governments or companies.  Therefore, those entities have 
not acquired full ownership at any point in the licensing, harvesting and marketing 
processes. 
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contribution.143  Other countries, like the United States, have 
argued the opposite: payments in kind can be the basis for a 
direct subsidy.144  The WTO appellate body, in previous cases, 
has also spoken on the issue, ruling against Canada and its 
restrictive interpretation that payments must be in the form of 
money: “[w]e, therefore, agree with the Panel that the ordinary 
meaning of the word ‘payments’ in Article 9.1(c) encompasses 
‘payments’ made in forms other than money, including revenue 
foregone.”145  Accordingly, it is not necessary that the cost for the 
reduced price of an input be born by the government.146  It is 
deemed sufficient that such a transfer of resources takes place 
“by virtue of governmental action.”147 
The past position of the WTO applied perfectly to the issue of 
an Aboriginal Title subsidy.  The argument of the Indigenous 
Peoples of Canada was that the federal government’s 
Comprehensive Claims Policy was a subsidy.148  That policy, 
along with its “business as usual” approach, constituted 
government actions that allowed corporations to exploit natural 
resources in the traditional territories of Indigenous Peoples 
without remuneration.149  In other words, the policy of the 
Canadian government conferred a benefit on Canadian 
integrated wood processing corporations, amounting to what 
many consider a subsidy.150 
C. Indigenous Peoples’ Precedent: Amicus Brief Accepted 
The Interior Alliance’s submission to the WTO presented the 
first ever substantive, rights-based Indigenous submission to an 
international trade tribunal.  In making its finding, the WTO 
panel at the outset commented on its receipt of the amicus brief: 
As a preliminary matter, we note that in the course of these 
proceedings, we decided to accept for consideration one unsolicited 
 
 143 See WTO Panel Report, supra note 134, ¶¶ 4.26-4.29. 
 144 See id. ¶¶ 4.93-4.96. 
 145 Report of the Appellate Body: Canada - Measures Affecting The Importation Of 
Milk And The Exportation Of Dairy Products, World Trade Organization, Doc. No. 
WT/DS103/AB/R (1999), ¶ 112, available at http://docsonline.wto.org. 
 146 Id. ¶ 115. 
 147 Id. ¶ 116. 
 148 Interior Alliance Amicus Brief, supra note 141. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Further supporting the argument for the finding of a subsidy was the reality that 
a sale of lumber resources by the province of British Columbia without accounting for the 
revenue due to Indigenous Peoples directly contributed to the artificial undervaluing of 
the resource.  Interior Alliance Amicus Brief, supra note 141.  The amicus curiae brief also 
noted that the province of British Columbia had repeatedly refused to discuss revenue 
sharing with the Interior Alliance and the federal government had refused to change its 
Comprehensive Claims Policy that provides the Aboriginal Title subsidy to corporations.  
Id. 
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amicus curiae brief from a Canadian non-governmental organization, 
the Interior Alliance.  This brief was submitted to us prior to the first 
substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties and the parties and 
third parties were given an opportunity to comment on this amicus 
curiae brief.  After this meeting, we received three additional 
unsolicited amicus curiae briefs.  For reasons relating to the timing of 
these submissions, we decided not to accept any of these later 
briefs.151 
The official acceptance of the first ever substantive 
submission made by Indigenous Peoples to a WTO panel set an 
important procedural precedent.  Prior to its acceptance, the 
WTO had rejected a number of amicus curiae briefs.  The 
acceptance of the amicus curiae brief was hailed as a great 
breakthrough by non-governmental actors.  While the ability to 
provide additional legal and substantive information on behalf of 
the Indigenous populations of Canada was important in and of 
itself, perhaps one of the most important results was a 
procedural one.  In accepting the amicus brief, the WTO officially 
circulated the brief to all parties and third parties for their 
comments.  By inviting comment on the brief, the WTO has 
taken a step towards opening the dialogue between nations and 
Indigenous Peoples, forcing countries who are parties to a WTO 
action to acknowledge and respond to the Indigenous position.152 
Of the five parties in the case, only two countries objected to 
the acceptance of the brief.  India objected on the grounds that 
the acceptance of amicus curiae submissions in WTO panel 
proceedings could open the door to industry.  Its fear was that 
corporations, who often have more resources than governments of 
developing countries, could use the amicus curiae process to 
undermine the arguments and position of sovereign nations.153  
Not surprisingly, Canada also opposed the filing of the amicus 
curiae brief, contradicting its earlier position that amicus curiae 
briefs, usually filed in support of the government’s position, 
should be considered.  In the end, only the United States, 
unopposed to the submission of the amicus curiae brief, actually 
 
 151 WTO Panel Report, supra note 134, ¶ 7.2. 
 152 Another procedural element determined by the WTO’s acceptance of the brief was 
the timeline for third party involvement.  Following the resolution of this dispute, 
Indigenous populations now know that, in WTO proceedings, third parties are only 
actively involved until the end of the first hearing by the panel or upon the panel’s specific 
request.  Any briefs received after the first panel hearing (such as the three additional 
briefs submitted in this case) will not be accepted. 
 153 Aboriginal Peoples involved in proceedings before the WTO have since made it 
clear that they would not bring industry arguments, and that even if such arguments 
where brought by an Indigenous group arguing commercial-industrial interests over 
Aboriginal interests, they should be rejected.  This was the case in the Softwood Lumber 
Dispute where the Meadow Lake Tribal Council filed a submission relying on industry 
arguments and the submission was rejected. 
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acknowledged the substantive argument posed in the brief in its 
second written submission to the panel.154 
The acceptance of the amicus curiae brief did not end the 
involvement of the Aboriginal Peoples in the WTO proceedings.  
Unfortunately, the often-criticized lack of transparency of the 
WTO, hurt Aboriginal participation and involvement in the 
proceedings.  For example, notification of the acceptance of their 
brief was only sent to the State parties, not the Aboriginal 
submitters.  In addition, throughout the proceedings, Aboriginal 
Peoples were forced to rely heavily on discussions and 
information being passed on by other parties, especially third 
parties.155  Despite some difficulty, the involvement of Aboriginal 
Peoples in the WTO proceedings was historic in and of itself.  
Almost more important was the ensuing communications that 
resulted between Aboriginal Peoples and state parties.  For the 
first time, state parties had to conceptualize Aboriginal rights on 
an international level, contributing to an important learning 
process and a growing international awareness of Indigenous 
proprietary interests. 
The general outcome of the WTO’s investigation was also 
encouraging for Aboriginal Peoples.  In general, Aboriginal 
Peoples support the finding of the WTO panel: 
In sum, and in the context of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) SCM Agreement, we 
are of the view that where a government allows the exercise of 
harvesting rights, it is providing standing timber to the harvesting 
companies.  From the perspective of the harvesting company the 
situation is clear: most forest land is Crown land, and if the company 
wants to cut the trees for processing or sale, it will need to enter into a 
stumpage contract with the provincial government, under which it 
will have to take on a number of obligations in addition to paying a 
stumpage fee for the trees actually harvested.156 
In other words, the WTO found that Canada was providing a 
good through its present stumpage system.  In so finding, the 
WTO also found that Canada’s providing of this was a potential 
subsidy against which countervailing duties could be levied in 
measure of the benefit incurred by the industry.157 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It must be recognized, in light of the WTO’s holding, that 
Indigenous Peoples believe they hold collective proprietary 
 
 154 WTO Panel Report, supra note 134, ¶ 4.252-4.297. 
 155 Even states that usually support high transparency, such as the member states of 
the European Union, often feel restricted by the rules and procedures of the WTO. 
 156 WTO Panel Report, supra note 134, ¶ 7.18. 
 157 Id. ¶¶ 7.20-7.30. 
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interests in their traditional territories.  In other words, it is the 
position of the Indigenous Peoples of Canada that Aboriginal 
Title coexists with, and is not subsumed by, the Title of the 
Crown.  Aboriginal Peoples should therefore be part of the 
decision making process over their land and resources, and 
companies should also be required to remunerate Indigenous 
Peoples’ proprietary interests. 
Canada’s arguments against the recognition of Aboriginal 
Title before the WTO and its own Courts illustrates just how 
many provinces try to undermine the proprietary interests of 
Aboriginal Peoples by strengthening commercial and industrial 
interests.  The provinces provide a benefit to companies in the 
form of a good by facilitating the taking of title from Aboriginal 
lands without requiring the consent of and remuneration to 
Indigenous Peoples.  In other words, the federal government 
provides a subsidy through government action enshrined in its 
policy of the non-recognition of Aboriginal Title, exonerating 
companies from having to remunerate Indigenous proprietary 
interests. 
The first submissions by Aboriginal Nations from the 
Interior of British Columbia to international trade tribunals, 
along with the acceptance of their amicus curiae brief by the 
WTO panel on the subsidization of softwood lumber, were 
important first steps in recognizing Aboriginal Title and resource 
rights.  These first substantive Indigenous submissions have 
opened the door for the debate of Indigenous rights at the 
international level and for future Indigenous interventions in 
trade disputes that impact their rights. 
Since the WTO investigation, the Interior Alliance nations 
were joined by a number of Aboriginal Nations from across 
Canada.  The platform for Indigenous rights has expanded to 
both a national and international level and is now known as the 
Indigenous Network on Economies and Trade (INET).158  INET is 
open to Indigenous nations that want to assert and protect their 
rights to their lands and resources.  As a platform that focuses on 
the macro-economic dimension of Indigenous rights, INET is 
working towards the fair and equitable recognition of Indigenous 
proprietary interests in the global economy.  Indigenous Peoples 
must continue to assert their rights both within their respective 
countries and on an international level in order to counter 
current trends calling for increased corporate control.  By 
involving themselves on an international front, Indigenous 
 
 158  For more information please visit http://www.indigenousnet.org/ or contact INET 
at inet@earthlink.net. 
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Peoples are hoping to not only win recognition of their 
proprietary rights, but also be active participants in trade 
negotiations impacting their lands and resources. 
